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Abstract  Spatial approaches to fisheries management in the form of total or
partial exclusion zones have attracted much interest in recent years, though
relatively little is known in practice about how such measures impact fishermen
or other groups of stakeholders. The present paper hopes to shed light on this
issue by reporting the results of a recently completed EU project investigating
the effects of a trawl ban introduced in the Gulf of Castellammare, NW Sicily, in
1990. The results indicate that the prohibition on trawling led to stock recovery and
improved financial returns for the artisanal fishermen who have been permitted to
operate within the restricted area. There is evidence, however, that the displacement
of trawlers to the outer periphery of the exclusion zone has impacted adversely on
artisanal operators located immediately outside the trawl ban area.
Key words   Exclusion zone, trawl ban, artisanal fishery, effort displacement.
JEL Classification Code  Q22.
Introduction
Marine exclusion zones (MEZs) may serve a variety of functions, and are increas-
ingly being used as a way of protecting vulnerable coastal habitats from the adverse
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effects of human activity. Their role in fisheries management has been extensively
discussed in the literature, with a number of recent papers focussing on the
bioeconomic implications of spatial relative to non-spatial approaches to manage-
ment (Holland and Brazee 1996; Hannesson 1998; Conrad 1999; Sanchirico and
Wilen 1999, 2001; Pezzey, Roberts, and Urdal 2000; Milon 2000; Li 2000;
Armstrong and Reithe 2001). Much of the debate has centred around the supposed
advantages of complete no-take marine reserves, but it must be remembered that
zones where preferential access is allowed to certain types of vessel but not others
have a long-established place in fisheries management. Such access arrangements
are often justified on the grounds that they eliminate user conflict through the sepa-
ration of incompatible gear types (e.g., active and passive fishing methods), or be-
cause they help to maintain artisanal fishing communities that are dependent on a
natural resource which is under threat from harvesting pressure. While this way of
managing fisheries may be criticised for failing to tackle the open-access problem,
with the added complaint that controls which discriminate against more powerful
catching methods are just another form of ‘regulated inefficiency,’ there may be oc-
casions when it represents the only politically acceptable way of regaining control
of a fishery whose sustainability is jeopardised by overexploitation.
The present case study, based on a project funded by the European Union (EC
97/0063), provides an illustration of this type of ‘partial’ exclusion zone approach to
fisheries management, namely one involving the areal separation of passive and ac-
tive gear types. In 1990, the Gulf of Castellammare (NW Sicily, Mediterranean) was
the location for a year-round trawling ban, the objective of which was to reduce
fishing pressure on the severely depleted demersal resources of the Gulf while per-
mitting small-scale artisanal operators to fish in safer conditions and enjoy the ben-
efits of stock recovery. An earlier EU-funded study (MED 92/011) carried out by
CNR-IRMA in 1993–95 demonstrated that the conservation objectives had been
achieved, with demersal stocks having increased dramatically within the exclusion
zone four years after the trawl ban was imposed. Specifically, the biomass estimated
from experimental trawl surveys was estimated to have increased eight-fold between
1987-89 and 1994 (Pipitone et al. 1996, 2000). The latest project (EC 97/0063), car-
ried out jointly by CNR-IRMA and CEMARE in 1998–99, aimed at updating the
biological data, specifically to see whether demersal stock abundance had continued
to increase and whether fish assemblage had changed (Pipitone, Badalamenti,
D’Anna, Whitmarsh, James, and Pickering 2000). It was also undertaken, however,
to establish how the trawl ban had impacted the artisanal fleet and, more generally,
to identify the relationship between the biological condition of the resource and the
financial performance of commercial operators. In this paper, we report some of the
findings of this study, focussing in particular on the differential effects of the trawl
ban on artisanal operators according to their location either within or on the periph-
ery of the management area.
The Artisanal Fishery in the Gulf of Castellammare
The Gulf of Castellammare occupies approximately 400 km2, with the exclusion
zone extending over some 200 km2 to a depth of about 500 metres in its central part
(figure 1). During the survey period (1998–99), there were 147 vessels registered to
fish from the four ports in the Gulf: Castellammare del Golfo, Balestrate, Trappeto,
and Terrasini. Of the total 147 vessels, 96 were registered artisanal fishing boats,
while the remainder consisted of trawlers, purse seiners, and unlicensed craft. The
main gear types employed by the artisanal fleet are trammel nets and set gillnets,
with occasional ad hoc use being made of bottom lining, FAD seining, and squid jig-Economic Effects of Fisheries Exclusion Zones 241
ging. Artisanal fishing is a year-round activity, though fishermen commonly observe
a voluntary tie-up of 45 days per year during the period from October to January.
The number of artisanal fishing vessels in the Gulf operating on a fully commercial
basis has shown no evidence of expansion since the trawl ban was introduced, in
contrast to recreational and angling boats whose numbers have increased rapidly in
recent years. Most of the trawlers are based at the port of Terrasini in the NE corner
of Gulf, and while their activity is now concentrated outside the exclusion zone, it is
common knowledge that a certain amount of illegal trawling takes place inside the
prohibited area, notably in the eastern sector.
The majority of fish are sold commercially, though some of the very low-value
species are retained for home consumption. In common with other Mediterranean
fisheries, a very wide variety of species make up the catch, some of the more impor-
tant being: red mullet (Mullus barbatus), picarel (Spicara flexuosa), sea breams
(Diplodus sargus, D. vulgaris, and Pagellus spp.), hake (Merluccius merluccius),
amberjack (Seriola dumerili), and dolphinfish (Coryphaena hippurus). The fish find
their way to the consumer via a somewhat complicated distribution channel; the
highest-value species command individual prices, while the low-value species are
typically sold as a ‘mixed bag.’
There are no quotas limiting the quantity of fish that can be landed, but a num-
ber of institutional arrangements are in place that influence the conduct of artisanal
fishing operations. For fishing to be undertaken as a professional enterprise, the
fisherman and his boat must be registered as such. Once registered, the fisherman is
then able to catch and sell fish for a living. The vessel must be registered as a pro-
fessional fishing boat before fish can be sold from it, and in fact, most of the restric-
tions on fishing apply to the vessel rather than to the fisherman. There is no licence
Figure 1.  The Gulf of Castellammare, NW SicilyWhitmarsh, James, Pickering, Pipitone, Badalamenti and D’Anna 242
fee as such, but certain costs are likely to be incurred in relation to the number of
registered crew per vessel. The fishing licence specifies what gear may be carried
and used as well as the maximum distance from the shore that an artisanal vessel
may operate (currently three miles). Though the law makes provision for the suspen-
sion of new licence issues, the practice of recent years has effectively been to grant
licences ad lib to eligible applicants. Of the various financial instruments, arguably
the most influential have been the ‘biological rest payments’ made each year be-
tween 1987 and 1997 which accompanied the 45 days per year cessation of fishing.
Though this had been discontinued by the time the present survey commenced, the
annual tie-up was still apparently being practiced by the majority of artisanal fisher-
men — evidence, perhaps, of the strength of informal rules and conventions within
the fishing community concerning the management of the natural resource.
Data Used in the Economic Assessment
The collection of primary economic data on the artisanal fisheries of the Gulf in-
volved the cooperation of fishermen, fish traders, and equipment suppliers. With re-
spect to fishermen, three major survey instruments were employed during 1998–99:
(i)A   landings survey designed to obtain information on the operating perfor-
mance of fishermen.
(ii)A   fishing characteristics survey aimed at identifying gear use, fishing pat-
terns, and markets.
(iii)A  motivations survey intended to elicit fishermen’s attitudes and opinions,
particularly with respect to the trawl ban.
The assessment of commercial landings consisted of two main elements, com-
mencing with a preliminary survey carried out in 1998 aimed at developing a com-
plete picture of the structure and composition of the fishing fleet in the Gulf. Vessel
registers at the Port Authorities of Castellammare del Golfo and Terrasini were con-
sulted, and these records were validated by field trips to the four main fishing har-
bors. The second element of the landings survey involved the fortnightly collection
of catch data from the artisanal fishermen at these ports on a census basis from July
1998 to June 1999. The data included the weight of each species fished and the ef-
fort employed in their capture, the effort measure being defined in terms of net
length and trip duration. The landings survey was also the main source of costs and
earnings data. While the procedure for generating this information broadly followed
custom and practice used elsewhere (Davidse et al. 1993; Pascoe, Robinson, and
Coglan 1997; European Commission 1998; Whitmarsh et al. 2000), the methodol-
ogy used in our study had two distinctive features. Firstly, the collection of data on a
‘real-time’ basis at fortnightly intervals over a 12-month period contrasted with the
approach more commonly used in cost and earnings studies involving the one-off re-
turn of annual financial data at a specified point in time. The advantage of the ap-
proach used here, we would contend, was that it permitted the monitoring of fleet
activity and performance throughout the year, as well as enabling us to generate ag-
gregate data once the survey was completed. Secondly, fishermen’s gross revenue
was calculated indirectly by using the physical weight of fish caught and then im-
puting a value obtained by asking traders the prices they were offering the catchers.
In this way, the reluctance of fishermen to divulge information about their income
was side-stepped. These costs and earnings data were corroborated by interviews
with the two accountants representing fishermen in the area.
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used in the economic assessment as part of our aim of identifying a link between the
state of the demersal stocks and the performance of the artisanal fishery. Four sea-
sonal experimental trawl surveys were carried out between June 1998 and March
1999 on the trawlable areas of the continental shelf using a stratified random sam-
pling design based on depth strata. The non-trawlable areas were assessed using 12
trammel-gillnet surveys at three locations within the infra-littoral zone of the Gulf
from June 1998 to May 1999 in order to examine the state of shallow water re-
sources. Comparative data from trammel-gillnet surveys carried out in earlier years
were also used. While the surveys aimed to monitor both fish assemblage and stock
abundance, it was the latter information that was of most relevance to the economic
assessment. The important indicator for our purposes is catch per unit of effort
(CPUE), which in the trawl surveys was measured as weight per haul and in the
trammel-gillnet surveys as weight per standard net per trip. For us, the main interest
is to see whether the CPUE data would enable any inferences to be drawn regarding
the impact of the trawl ban on vessel operating performance.
Analysis and Results
Profitability of the Artisanal Fishery
Data on the costs and earnings of the artisanal operators in the Gulf provided the ba-
sis for assessing current profitability and also for seeing how financial performance
would change if operating conditions were to deviate from the 1998–99 baseline
levels. Fishermen cooperated well with the landings survey, and the costs and earn-
ings results represented just under 50% of the total number of registered artisanal
vessels. Here we report the results for trammel netting, the most widely used method
in the artisanal fishery.
Net financial profit (boat income) in 1998–99 averaged 8.7 million lira (4,493
Euros) per vessel, though as figure 2 shows, there were large inter-vessel variations
in performance. Just over 15% of operators incurred losses, while some 9% earned
profits in excess of 25 million lira (12,911 Euros). To investigate whether it would
be financially worthwhile to invest in the fishery, a capital budgeting model was
constructed based on the returns expected from a representative one-crewman tram-
mel netter. Data were derived from the landings survey and also from information
regarding the purchase and replacement of capital items (boat, gear, and equipment)
supplied by manufacturers. Using a 20-year planning horizon produced an internal
rate of return (IRR) of 30%, substantially in excess of the opportunity cost of capital
(6–12%), which fishermen might realistically incur for such a venture. This is an
important result because it suggests that, if the operating conditions that existed dur-
ing the survey year were to be maintained into the foreseeable future, it would be
rational to invest in the fishery rather than in the next best alternative use of funds.
As such, the artisanal fishery has the potential to be economically sustainable, since
the capital necessary for its long-term continuation would be expected to earn a
competitive return. The assumption of unchanged operating conditions would, of
course, no longer be satisfied if the trawling ban were to be relaxed. It might also be
argued that the prospects for investment might be similarly jeopardised if, even with
the trawl ban still in place, profits attracted significantly more artisanal vessels into
the area. Whether this happens, and how rapidly, clearly depends on the strength of
both the formal and informal barriers to entry into the artisanal fishery. However,
the fact that over the previous decade there has not been a conspicuous increase in
the number of artisanal operators, despite the favourable conditions induced by the
trawl ban, seems to suggest that such entry barriers are non-trivial.Whitmarsh, James, Pickering, Pipitone, Badalamenti and D’Anna 244
Implications of Variation in Catch Rates
We were also concerned to see by how much financial performance would
change if vessel catch rates deviated from their baseline levels. Though catch
rates are only one of the factors affecting profitability, they are an important
policy variable and an indicator of the success of fisheries management in
maintaining fish stocks. Table 1 compares the actual 1998–99 financial results
with those which would have been obtained if catch rates had been 25% higher
or lower. The simulated results are derived from a simple financial model of the
revenue and cost structure of vessels, the key assumptions of which are:
(i) For boats which employ extra crew, labor costs are based on an agreed share of
net revenue (total revenue minus running costs) and that in the short run, this
share rate remains constant.
(ii) Running costs vary directly with the vessel utilisation rate (i.e., days fishing
per year).
(iii) Supplies from this one fishery represent only a small part of the total market;
therefore, prices will be unaffected by localised variations in catch rates.
Accordingly, the profit function may be written as:




Figure 2.  Profitability of Artisanal Fisheries in the Gulf of Castellammare, 1998–99Economic Effects of Fisheries Exclusion Zones 245
i.e.,
Π= − − − [] − pEK cE w pEK cE F
where:
Π = profit (lira per vessel per year)
p = price (lira per kg)
E = utilisation rate (days fishing per year)
K = vessel catch rate (kg per day fishing)
c = average running cost (lira per day fishing)
w = crew share rate (percent)
F = vessel fixed costs (lira per boat per year)
It is clear from table 1 that a change in vessel catch rates causes a major shift in the
frequency distribution of profits. Starting at the 1998–99 operating levels, the re-
sults suggest that a 25% change in catch rates (K) would lead to approximately a
50% change in profits in the same direction. This highlights the sensitivity of finan-
cial performance to variations in fish stock abundance which, as the biological as-
sessments of the Gulf have clearly demonstrated, is linked with the effectiveness of
the trawl ban.
Table 1
Profitability of Artisanal Vessels in the Gulf of Castellammare
Under Alternative Assumptions Regarding Catch Rates
Distribution of Vessels According to Income Range
Results Results
Assuming a Assuming a
Actual Results 25% Fall in 25% Rise in
Boat Income for 1998–99 Catch Rates Catch Rates
Below minus 10 m. lira 3 3 3
From minus 10 m. to minus 5 m. lira 0 1 0
From minus 5 m. lira to zero 4 7 1
From zero to 5 m. lira 10 11 7
From 5 m. to 10 m. lira 8 13 6
From 10 m. to 15 m. lira 8 6 9
From 15 m. to 20 m. lira 7 3 6
From 20 m. to 25 m. lira 2 2 8
More than 25 m. lira 4 0 6
Average boat income 8.71 m. lira 4.20 m. lira 13.22 m. lira
Note: ‘Boat income’ is a measure of financial profit, which is defined as total sales revenue minus run-
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Effects of the Trawl Ban on Artisanal Fleet Performance
Since no detailed costs and earnings data of artisanal fishermen in the Gulf are
available for the years prior to 1998–99, it has not been possible to give an explicit
demonstration of any improvement in financial performance over the period of the
trawl ban. The evidence for such an improvement can be inferred, however, from a
comparison of the results of the trammel-gillnet survey undertaken in the most re-
cent period with those of earlier years. These demonstrate a 77% increase between
1990 and 1999 in the abundance of shallow water species, which are the main target
of the artisanal fishermen in the Gulf, and this increase can be expected to have
positively affected catch rates and profits. It should also be added, however, that
over this period the species composition changed, with most of the biomass increase
being for varieties of fish classed as only ‘moderately’ commercial (Pipitone,
Badalamenti, D’Anna, Whitmarsh, James, and Pickering 2000). What this means in
effect is that the increase in the economic abundance of the stocks has been less pro-
nounced than the increase in physical abundance, and as such, the gains to the
artisanal fishermen, though positive, will have been partially attenuated.
To investigate further whether there was a connection between the trawl ban and
the performance of the artisanal fleet, a comparison was made between vessels lo-
cated at the three ports inside the exclusion zone (Castellemmare del Golfo,
Balestrate, and Trappeto) and those located at the port immediately outside
(Terrasini). Though artisanal vessels based outside the trawl ban area earned posi-
tive profits, on average, evidence that trawling may have adversely affected their
productivity is revealed by the comparative catch data for trammel netters at the
four ports derived from the landings survey (table 2). At Terrasini, standardised
catch rates (weight of fish caught per 1,000 metres of net per trip) were between
one-half and two-thirds of those achieved at the ports within the trawl ban area, in-
dicative of the lower abundance of shallow water species on grounds where trawling
remains unrestricted. Interviews with fishermen suggest that the incursion of trawl-
ers forced an adaptation in their fishing behaviour. Of particular note is that, in con-
trast to the other three ports, artisanal fishermen at Terrasini travelled, on average, a
greater distance (and spent correspondingly more time) to reach suitable fishing
grounds in order to avoid conflict with displaced trawlers which, in recent years,
have tended to concentrate on the periphery of the banned area. This avoidance tac-
tic seems to have impacted on costs, since expenditure on fuel as a proportion of to-
tal expenses was higher at Terrasini than elsewhere (table 2). It is worth noting that
artisanal vessels at Terrasini spent fewer days at sea per year, on average, than at the
other ports, which again, based on interviews with fishermen, can be interpreted as a
response to the congestion externalities (i.e., a ‘crowding out’ effect) and stock ex-
ternalities caused by the presence of trawlers.
The evidence of differential productivity is corroborated by results from the bio-
logical assessments carried out as part of the earlier EU project (MED 92/011) and
the present one. Experimental trawl surveys undertaken at defined sampling loca-
tions within the Gulf enable us to compare stock abundance of demersal species in-
side and outside the exclusion zone. A summary of the data is given in table 3 from
which it becomes clear that, in each of the four seasons in 1993–94 and 1998–99,
stock abundance within the trawl ban area was higher than in the corresponding sea-
son outside the area. Though the experimental trawl surveys do not include all shal-
low water species and, as such, are not fully representative of the catch of the typi-
cal artisanal trammel netter, they nevertheless give a strong indication of the differ-
ential impact of the trawl ban on the fisheries resources of the Gulf. The abundance
of demersal stocks within the exclusion zone has generally been maintained or in-
creased throughout the period 1993–94 to 1998–99, despite the fact that illegalEconomic Effects of Fisheries Exclusion Zones 247
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trawling is known to occur. There is no obvious sign that stocks in the unrestricted
part of the Gulf have fallen between these dates, though it is interesting to note that
in the most recent season (winter 1999) CPUE was down to 40% of what it had been
five years previously. While a number of factors may have contributed to this, the
evidence is consistent with claims made by fishermen of increased trawling effort
and decreased catches on coastal grounds in the Eastern sector of the Gulf. When
considering the period as a whole, however, evidence suggests that the trawl ban had
a positive impact on demersal stocks. This is supported by the regression results
given in the Appendix showing that the CPUE differential between the protected and
unprotected zones was unlikely due to chance.
Concluding Remarks
The partial exclusion zone introduced into the Gulf of Castellammare in 1990 has
undoubtedly benefited the artisanal fishermen who have been permitted to operate
within the prohibited area. The evidence for this comes from two main sources.
Firstly, there are the biological survey results, which have demonstrated a large in-
crease in demersal biomass since the ban was imposed. While there are indications
that species composition may have changed over the period, the higher overall stock
abundance can be expected to translate into improved catch rates for artisanal ves-
sels. The second main source of evidence is derived from the observed differences
in the physical productivity of vessels according to their location, with artisanal op-
erators based at ports inside the trawl ban area achieving higher catch rates than
those outside. The finding is supported by the experimental trawl surveys demon-
strating that CPUE is markedly higher on fishing grounds presently located inside
the prohibited area. These empirical observations are consistent with the theoretical
expectations of bioeconomic modelling studies of marine reserves, notably the
model by Hannesson (1998) showing inter alia that stock density within a zone
where fishing is restricted will be higher than in an adjacent area where fishing is
uncontrolled. What our case study has also revealed, however, is that artisanal fish-
ermen based outside the management area have not simply failed to capture the ben-
efits of stock recovery, but seem to have become worse off as a consequence of in-
creased activity by displaced trawlers.
Table 3
Comparative Stock Abundance Inside and Outside the Trawl Ban Area
Inside Outside
Mean CPUE S.D. Number of Mean CPUE S.D. Number of
Date (kg per 30 Minute Haul) Valid Hauls (kg per 30 Minute Haul) Valid Hauls
Autumn 1993 33.82 21.04 24 24.39 20.92 9
Winter 1994 45.16 31.42 20 29.88 23.62 11
Spring 1994 32.52 21.00 24 25.53 14.01 6
Summer 1994 34.33 19.31 19 23.16 16.62 11
Spring 1998 39.09 22.50 17 26.31 18.26 9
Summer 1998 54.93 33.77 22 37.40 28.71 4
Autumn 1998 59.74 31.63 19 35.00 15.45 7
Winter 1999 33.14 27.03 20 11.70 3.34 7Economic Effects of Fisheries Exclusion Zones 249
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Appendix
To establish whether there was a statistically significant difference between CPUE
inside and outside the trawl ban area, an ANOVA was carried out using data from
the experimental trawl surveys undertaken in 1993–94 and 1998–99. For analytical
purposes, the Gulf was divided into four radial sectors corresponding to the fishing
zones of each harbor. The rationale for this design was that there was the expecta-
tion of a decreasing gradient of fish stock abundance from the core of the bannedWhitmarsh, James, Pickering, Pipitone, Badalamenti and D’Anna 250
area (i.e., the westernmost sector, the port of Castellammare) to the unrestricted area
(i.e., the easternmost sector, the port of Terrasini). Data were also disaggregated into
two bathymetric depth strata, 51–100 metres and 101–200 metres.
Initial results of a three-way ANOVA suggested no significant difference be-
tween the years, and the CPUE data were then pooled to detect any possible differ-
ence between the sectors and depth strata. This revealed that CPUE in the sectors
adjacent to the three inner ports (Castellammare, Balestrate, and Trappeto) was sig-
nificantly higher than CPUE in the outside sector (Terrasini), and also that CPUE in
the 51–100 metre depth stratum was greater than in the 101–200 metre stratum. Fur-
ther analysis was conducted within a multiple regression framework using binary
(i.e., dummy) variables to represent the different sectors and strata. These were de-
fined as follows:
Variable Value
CM 1 for Castellammare, 0 for all other ports
BA 1 for Balestrate, 0 for all other ports
TR 1 for Trappeto, 0 for all other ports
STRATUM 1 for depth stratum 51–100 metres, 0 for stratum 101–200 metres
This procedure, therefore, takes the reference category as CPUE in the deeper of the
two depth strata within the sector corresponding to Terrasini (i.e., outside the pro-
tected zone). The model then tests to see whether departures from this arbitrary refer-
ence point in respect of either fishing zone or depth stratum cause a significant shift in
the constant term in the regression equation. To preserve the degrees of freedom we as-
sume for simplicity that there is no interaction between the independent variables.
The results are presented in appendix table A. The model explains about one-
third of the observed variations in CPUE, with the value of the Durbin-Watson sta-
tistic implying that there are no unusual patterns in the residuals. For our purposes,
the important result is given in the t-statistics, which confirm that the three sectors
inside the trawl ban area each have significantly higher CPUE than the sector imme-
diately outside, and that the shallower of the two depth strata is more productive
than the deeper area.
Appendix Table A
Results of a Multiple Regression Model to Test for the Effects of the Trawl Ban on CPUE
Variable Regression Coefficient t-statistic Significance
Constant 14.38 2.12 0.04
CM 27.36 3.19 0.00
BA 20.85 2.43 0.02
TR 20.00 2.33 0.02
STRATUM 28.33 6.07 0.00
N = 64
R2 = 0.36
Adjusted R2 = 0.32
S.E.E. = 24.27
Durbin-Watson = 2.12
F = 8.304